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Abstract 
The announcement of the three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) on December 8, 2011, signaled the beginning of the largest 
ECB market liquidity programs to date. Continued and increasing liquidity-related pressures 
in the form of ballooning financial market credit default swap (CDS) spreads, Euro-area 
volatility, and interbank lending rates prompted a much more forceful ECB response than 
what had been done previously. The LTROs, using a repurchase (repo) agreement auction 
mechanism, allowed any Eurozone financial institution to tap essentially unlimited funding 
at a fixed rate of just 1%. Because the three-year LTROs were so similar to their shorter-
maturity counterparts, the types of eligible collateral were almost identical, though the 
three-year operations were slightly less strict with the types of asset-backed securities 
(ABS), loans, and debts that could be pledged. The first operation, conducted on December 
22, 2011, saw 523 banks draw €489.2 billion in funding, and the second operation, finalized 
on February 29, 2012, saw 800 banks draw €529.5 billion. Much of the liquidity, rather than 
being put into private credit markets, was placed at the ECB deposit facility to supplement 
the interbank lending market. Banks that were more vulnerable to a credit crunch, often 
located in peripheral countries such as Spain and Italy, tended to use the facility more and 
also drove the increase in the supply of private credit. Less at-risk institutions tended to 
engage in “reach-for-yield” strategies with debt from riskier sovereigns. Post-crisis 
evaluations were mixed, but analysts tend to agree that the facilities helped ease the initial 
shock in the Euro-area money market and reduce the impact of the credit crunch on the 
broader economy. 
Keywords: European Central Bank, ECB, Long-Term Refinancing Operations, LTRO, market 
liquidity programs, market liquidity, wholesale funding, credit markets, repurchase 
agreements, repos  
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 









At a Glance  
Despite the acute pressures of the Global Financial 
Crisis having passed, conditions in European 
interbank lending and money markets continued to 
deteriorate through 2011. This was apparent in 
ballooning financial market CDS spreads, interbank 
lending rates, and money market volatility. 
Increasing liquidity pressures prompted the 
European Central Bank (ECB) to respond more 
forcefully, with the announcement of two three-year 
Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) on 
December 8, 2011. Previously, the ECB had 
conducted LTROs and other refinancing operations 
to support monetary policy goals and address 
liquidity pressures. But the earlier LTROs had 
maturity horizons of no more than one year.  
The three-year LTROs were conducted via an 
auction mechanism. These auctions allowed 
European financial institutions to bid for funding in 
the form of repurchase (repo) agreements, with the 
ECB as the counterparty. European financial 
institutions with eligible collateral could bid on essentially unlimited amounts of funding, as the ECB did not 
specify a hard cap. The repos were auctioned at a fixed rate of 1%.  
Eligible collateral was expanded from previous operations to include asset-backed securities (ABS) with a 
second-best rating of at least “single-A” at issuance that would continue to hold that rating; assets made up of 
loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); and government-guaranteed liabilities. Banks that 
participated in the ECB’s earlier one-year LTRO in October 2011 were also given an option to lengthen the 
maturity of repo agreements obtained there to three years on December 22, 2011, the day of the first auction. 
The first operation saw 523 banks draw €489.2 billion in funding, and the second operation, finalized on 
February 29, 2012, saw 800 banks draw €529.5 billion for a grand total of approximately €1.02 trillion.  
Summary Evaluation 
The three-year LTRO program was the ECB’s largest market liquidity program ever. It received mixed reviews. 
The ECB argued that the program had eased strains in European money markets and helped to prevent a Euro-
wide credit crunch. Lenders who were most vulnerable to the credit crunch, often in peripheral countries like 
Italy and Spain, tended to use the facility more and were the main drivers of private credit growth. While credit 
growth contracted, one analysis concluded that it would have contracted more if the LTROs had not been in 
place. Many lenders, particularly those that were less vulnerable, opted to use the cheap financing to invest in 
high-yield government bonds. Conversely, much of the funding was deposited at the ECB deposit facility, 
suggesting that the ECB became a large substitute in the interbank lending market.   
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To address intense liquidity-related 
pressures in Euro-area money markets to avoid a 
credit crunch. 
Announcement Date   December 8, 2011 
Operational Date 1st: December 22, 2011 
2nd: February 29, 2012 
Date of First Issuance 1st: December 22, 2011 
2nd: March 1, 2012 
Final Repayment 
Date 
1st: January 29, 2015 
2nd: February 26, 2015 
Program Size Unlimited; unspecified 
Usage  1st: €489.2 billion by 523 
banks. 
2nd: €529.5 billion by 800 
banks. 
Outcomes Approximately €1.02 trillion 
drawn on by at least 800 
banks. 
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Despite numerous conventional and unconventional interventions by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and various national governments to alleviate stresses brought on by the Global 
Financial Crisis, the Eurozone was still in a shaky position at the start of 2011. A blooming 
sovereign debt crisis, catalyzed by the downgrading of Greek debt by ratings agencies and 
upward revisions by the Greek government to their total indebtedness, sent European 
markets back into turmoil. 
Financial institutions became more and more liquidity constrained as conditions worsened. 
European money markets chilled, with liquidity concerns morphing into solvency ones as 
financing became more expensive. EURIBOR-OIS spreads rose to over 100 basis points in 
July 2011. Volatility also rose sharply. Despite being a few years removed from the Global 
Financial Crisis, credit default swap (CDS) spreads for financial institutions rose to over 350 
basis points in mid-2011, almost 200 basis points higher than spreads of nonfinancial 
institutions (ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2012).  
Several countries on the Eurozone periphery found themselves in increasingly precarious 
financial positions. Sovereign CDS spreads and sovereign debt yields for Italy and Spain rose 
precipitously, indicating that investors were wary about sovereign debt. 
Program Description 
To remedy these conditions, the ECB announced on December 8, 2011, that it would conduct 
two three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) in December 2011 and February 
2012. Previously, the ECB had conducted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) and 
Main Refinancing Operations (MROs) that had maturities of up to one year. This 
announcement marked the first time the ECB would issue such long-term funding. This 
decision was unprecedented, though not surprising given the conditions of European 
financial markets at the time. 
The actual mechanism for conducting these operations was through repurchase (repo) 
auctions held by the ECB. Repo agreements, which are just forms of collateralized lending for 
normally short terms, were how the ECB conducted earlier LTROs and MROs. Financial 
institutions with eligible collateral could bid and, in effect, purchase ECB funding at a rate 
comparable to, or often much cheaper than, rates in private markets. These institutions could 
then use the new financing to lend to nonfinancial firms that were also experiencing the 
effects of a credit crunch and thus alleviate those liquidity-related pressures. In the case of 
the Eurozone, the money obtained via the LTROs could also be used to buy sovereign debt of 
peripheral countries like Italy and Spain, some of which was trading several hundred basis 
points higher than that of core countries. These governments, which were experiencing 
extreme difficulty in selling their sovereign debt, were thus able to indirectly access ECB 
funding while simultaneously allowing banks to get rid of toxic assets on their balance 
sheets. The primary objective of the program, therefore, was to improve short-term 
financing conditions for European financial institutions so that the effects of a continent-
wide credit crunch wouldn’t be felt by the real economy.  
For the two three-year LTROs, auctions were held on December 22, 2011, and February 29, 







funding obtained at these auctions could be repaid early after one year either in full or by 
the week The ECB also permitted any banks that were counterparties to earlier one-year 
LTROs that were settled in October 2011 to extend their maturity to three years, so long as 
they notified their respective national central banks (NCBs) by December 19, 2011. In total, 
€45.7 billion of €56.9 billion, or just over 80%, was converted this way (ECB Monthly 
Bulletin, March 2012).  
Financial institutions could bid on as much long-term funding as they felt they needed, 
provided they had the appropriate collateral. Additionally, the rates paid for the funding, at 
just 1%, were much lower than what private markets were offering. This was primarily true 
for banks on the Eurozone periphery, which were seen as less creditworthy than their 
Eurozone core counterparts. Thus, banks in the periphery could lock in unlimited amounts 
of low-cost, long-term funding while cleaning up their balance sheet.  
Despite structuring the three-year LTROs similarly to its previous LTROs, the ECB added 
several additional stipulations to expand the range of eligible collateral, incorporating loans 
to SMEs and additional mortgage-related assets (“ECB announces measures to support bank 
lending and money market activity” 2011). In the case of asset-backed securities, only the 
most senior tranches were eligible (“FAQs on the measures to support bank lending and 
money market activity” 2011). 
Finally, government-guaranteed debt was also eligible, which, in some cases, made banks 
self-select into government guarantee programs.3 This gave institutions the option to use 
this guaranteed debt as collateral in the LTROs to obtain low-rate ECB financing, which they 
would then invest in higher-yield government debt, usually from peripheral countries.  
Outcomes 
When the last auction settled at the end of February 2012, over €1 trillion in repo 
agreements had been issued, making the three-year LTROs the largest Eurosystem market 
liquidity programs ever. The first LTRO, settled on December 21, 2011, was widely seen as 
more important for severely liquidity-restrained institutions and totaled €489.2 billion for 
523 banks. The second, which settled on February 29, 2012, and had a much wider 
participation, totaled €529.5 billion for 800 banks. Liquidity appeared to return following 
the announcement and settlement of both operations. CDS spreads, particularly financial 
CDS, declined nearly 150 basis points from their 350 basis point peak. Interbank lending 
rates and Eurosystem money market volatility also fell (ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2012).  
As mentioned earlier, banks in Italy and Spain were particularly vulnerable in 2011. They 
accounted for approximately two-thirds of the total amount issued under the three-year 
LTRO (Carpinelli and Crosignani 2017). Overall LTRO activity peaked while the three-year 
LTRO was in place, nearly doubling from its previous peak of about €896 billion during the 
Global Financial Crisis.4 Additionally, the balance sheet of the ECB grew significantly, rising 
almost to the size of the Fed’s and the Bank of England’s by 2012 (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 
2012). The driving force behind this expansion was the huge increase in repo transactions 
conducted by the ECB during both the Global Financial Crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3 See Evaluation section for further discussion. 
4 This was as of the week of June 19, 2009. 
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From February 2007 to February 2012, 64% of the growth in the ECB’s balance sheet came 
from an increase in repo agreements. (See Figure 1) 
Figure 1: Volume of ECB Refinancing Operations (€ billions, left axis) and three-month 
EURIBOR rate (monthly, right axis) 
 
 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
Banks in southern Europe made up 70% of medium- and long-term refinancing operations 
(Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 2012). Core Eurozone countries also were much more likely to repay 
any three-year LTRO funding early, with German banks reducing LTRO funding reliance by 
80% from 2012 to 2013. In contrast, Italian banks repaid only 20% of funds and Spanish 
banks 45% by 2013 (Daetz et al. 2018). Many banks that used the program also opted to 
place much of the liquidity at the ECB deposit facility, although it paid interest of only 25 
basis points, compared with the 100 basis point fee that financial institutions paid at the 
auctions. The amount outstanding in the deposit facility nearly doubled following the two 
operations. After the first three-year LTRO on December 2011, the amount outstanding shot 
up to €411.8 billion from €214.1 billion, a 92% increase. The second three-year LTRO  
yielded an ever larger amount of euros outstanding in the facility: from €477.3 billion to 
€820.8 billion, an increase of 72% and the highest recorded during the crisis.5 (See Figure 
2.) While the portion of these funds that came from the three-year LTROs is unknown, the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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dramatic increases following the allotments certainly suggests that some European financial 
institutions opted to place their money in the deposit facility. The deposits held at the ECB 
would hover at over €700 billion until July 2012, when the ECB lowered the deposit facility 
rate to 0% (“Key ECB interest rates”) (See Figure 3).  
Figure 2: ECB Deposit Facility Amount Outstanding (weekly, € billions) 
 
 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
Early repayment was a key feature of these operations, as it meant that the pair of three-year 
LTROs were effectively two one-year LTROs with an up to three-year maturity extension 
option. Participants were eligible to return funds from the first and second LTROs on January 
25, 2013, and February 22, 2013, respectively. From January 25, 2013, to June 27, 2013, 
approximately €205.8 billion and €101.7 billion were repaid from the first and second 
LTROs, respectively (ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2013). This suggested that the adverse 
pressure felt by many European financial institutions at the onset of the programs had 
lessened dramatically. However, other factors, such as a general return to more “stable” 
sources of funding, widespread balance sheet adjustments, and signaling effects, also have 
played roles in the amounts repaid (ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2013).  
Following the operations, there was a dramatic increase in excess liquidity in the system, 
rising from €258.1 billion to €775.6 billion between the maintenance periods of November 
2011 and March 2012 (ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2013). Initially, European banks repaid 
their funds faster than markets anticipated, and expected Euro Overnight Index Average 
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taper off quicker than expected. However, early repayment amounts quickly flattened and 
became relatively steady following the large initial burst of early repayments. As a result, 
short-term money market rates tended to stay just above the deposit rate.  
 Key Design Decisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
1. The three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations were designed to provide 
liquidity to European financial institutions to lend on private wholesale funding 
markets during a period of persistent and growing market tension. 
The financing itself took the form of longer-term repo agreements, with maturities of three 
years. Not unlike other, more standard refinancing operations, the ECB conducted an auction 
for each of the two LTROs in which financial institutions could pledge collateral in exchange 
for long-term, wholesale funding. 
2. Legal authority for the operations came from Article 18.1 of the ESCB Treaty. 
Article 18.1 specifically gives the ECB the authority to engage in repo agreements, which 
were the types of funding used for the three-year LTROs (“Institutional Provisions”). The 
article specifically states that “. . . the ECB and the national central banks may: 
(i) operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright (spot and forward) 
or under repurchase agreement and by lending or borrowing claims and marketable 
instruments, whether in euro or other currencies, as well as precious metals; 
(ii) conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants, 
with lending being based on adequate collateral.” 
3. The program was administered by the respective national central banks (NCBs) 
that each participating financial institution was located in. 
In order to perform an early repayment, lenders had to (i) notify their respective National 
Central Bank (NCB) at least one week in advance with the intent to repay early and (ii) repay 
on the next settlement day of any of the ECB’s regularly scheduled Main Refinancing 
Operations (MROs). 
NCBs also had some discretion when it came to eligibility of collateral and could accept 
“additional performing credit claims that satisfy specific eligibility criteria,” provided that 
they take responsibility for, or bear the risk for, credit claims that are accepted this way. 
4. The ECB did not place an explicit cap on the amount of funding auctioned. 
At the conclusion of the second auction, the total amount of three-year LTROs outstanding 







second had €529.5 billion auctioned to 800 banks. A number of sources specifically cite the 
potential level of funding as unlimited.6 
5. All Euro-area banks were eligible to participate in the program. 
The first and second LTROs had participation from 523 and 800 banks, respectively, from 19 
different countries. Additionally, institutions in the southern periphery of the Eurozone had 
considerably more activity, accounting for over 70% of medium- to long-term refinancing 
operation funding as the crisis intensified (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 2012). Specifically, banks 
in Spain and Italy were very active, accounting for approximately two-thirds of the total 
amount issued (Carpinelli and Crosignani 2017).  
6. Sovereign debt, government-guaranteed securities, and senior ABS tranches 
were eligible, with some caveats. 
All of the usual collateral accepted in normal refinancing operations was eligible. Additional 
securities were also included, such as: 
(i) “ABS having a second-best rating of at least ‘single-A’ in the Eurosystem’s 
harmonized credit scale at issuance, at all times subsequently.” 
(ii) “The underlying assets of which comprise residential mortgages and loans to 
SMEs.” 
(iii) Government-guaranteed debt.  
In addition to the eligibility criteria listed above, the ECB required the following: 
(i) All cash-flow-generating assets used as collateral had to be of the same class. 
(ii) Nonperforming, structured, syndicated, or leveraged loans were ineligible. 
(iii) Any institution that was a counterparty or a “close third-party” to ABS used as 
collateral could not act as interest rate swap providers. 
(iv) All documentation was required to have servicing continuity provisions. 
7. The LTROs had three-year terms, with an option of early repayment after one 
year. 
This was the first time that three-year LTROs had been issued. Prior to these, only LTROs 
with terms of one year or less had been issued. The new agreements could also be repaid 
early after one year as well, either all at once or on a weekly basis, so long as the early 
repayment day was the same as the settlement day for an MRO (ECB Monthly Bulletin, 
February 2013). Participating institutions only had to give their respective NCB one week’s 
notice of their intent to repay prematurely. Additionally, the ECB allowed banks that had 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 See Carpinelli and Crosignani 2017; Andrade et al. 2017; Daetz et al. 2018. 
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tapped financing from the one-year LTRO in October 2011 to refinance these operations into 
three-year LTROs as part of the first allotment in December.  
8. There does not appear to have been a cap on banks’ participation, and there 
were no minimum amounts required. 
European financial institutions access as much funding as they wanted, so long as they had 
enough eligible collateral. The ECB did not specify a hard cap or a floor on the amount of 
funding that institutions could access under the program. 
9. The rates for the LTRO auctions were a flat 1%. 
This rate was the average of the ECB’s main refinancing operations (MROs) over the course 
of the operation, which were variable rate. At the time of the auction, ECB repo rates were 
1%. EONIA swaps, which were a proxy for future MRO rate levels, indicated that they would 
likely stay low (Andrade et al. 2017). 
10. Two auctions were held for the two operations: the first on December 22, 2011, 
and the second on February 29, 2012.  
Both auctions, however, were announced on December 8, 2011. The ECB continued to 
conduct its weekly auctions for main refinancing operations (MROs) and shorter-term 
LOTRs for three-month, six-month, and one-year maturities. These operations did not cease 
despite adverse market conditions. 
 Evaluation  
Because of the massive size of the program, the three-year LTROs have been quite heavily 
scrutinized by academics, journalists, and politicians alike. Generally speaking, institutions 
that were most acutely distressed during the sovereign debt crisis tended to use the facilities 
the most. The ECB stated that banks that were more risky tended to bid more at the LTROs, 
and that even if private markets were able to provide some funding to banks, there was still 
a heavy incentive to borrow from the facility. However, they stated that “by improving 
funding conditions, the ECB may have prevented the disorderly shedding of assets, which 
would have placed certain financial market sectors under pressure” as well as emphasizing 
a belief that the introduction of these programs contained spillover effects to larger markets 
(ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2012).  
This rationale was very clear because, while there was not significant growth in private 
credit or bank lending relative to the size of the program, it was effective in halting the 
freefall and ultimately stabilizing these two channels. Additionally, spillover effects from the 
financial sector to the real economy, which was one of the ECB’s chief concerns when 
designing the program, appeared to have been significantly lessened owing to the increase 
in system-wide liquidity. 
One study by the National Bank of Belgium estimated that Euro-area output and inflation 
were significantly impacted and would have been more than 1% lower without the 







despite not being a primary objective of the program. In Spain, Italy, and Ireland, sovereign 
debt yields decreased around the time of the announcement, with the largest decrease being 
51 basis points for Spanish two-year bonds (Krishnamurthy et al. 2017).  
Despite the seemingly robust impact on sovereign debt markets and macroeconomic 
aggregates, the results were mixed for bank lending, which was the primary area the ECB 
was trying to affect. In a paper published in November 2018, Stine Louise Daetz and her 
coauthors emphasized that, while these programs appeared to have halted the decline in 
corporate investment, there was no significant increase in lending either. Distressed lenders 
did not lend more heavily. However, companies that were able to obtain new loans from 
lenders who received LTRO financing increased their investment. Finally, the authors 
provided an interesting counterfactual analysis, explaining that non-Eurozone companies 
that did not have direct access to LTRO financing decreased their investment more than 
those in the Eurozone (Daetz et al. 2018). 
Some analysts argued that the LTROs did not adequately address their primary goals. Italian 
and Spanish bond yields, while positively impacted by the first round of three-year LTROs, 
still continued to increase in the later parts of 2012. Spain specifically saw a precipitous 
increase in its 10-year bond yield, from 5% to 7.6% from March 2012 to July 2012 (Sia 
Partners 2012). The deteriorating quality of some sovereign debt was also an issue both at 
the ECB and in periphery banks, which had bought the debt in bulk. For the ECB, a default by 
any of these periphery countries, however unlikely, would seriously damage the quality of 
some of the assets on the ECB’s balance sheet. For periphery banks, Sia Partners used Fitch 
downgrading Santander and BBVA to BBB+ shortly after doing the same to Spain’s credit 
rating a week prior as an example, suggesting that many of these banks were now tightly tied 
to their sovereigns. The Economist echoed similar sentiment, arguing that the austerity 
measures that Spain had instituted were actually harming its return to economic growth, 
and that the acute phase of the crisis was still quite close (“Draghi strikes back II”). 
One evaluation written by Jean Pisani-Ferry and Guntram Wolff called these operations the 
Eurozone equivalent of QE, but that it did not have the same impact as its sister program. 
This was predicated on the fact that approximately €700 billion was put into the ECB deposit 
facility rather than lent out, suggesting that the ECB had become a large substitute in the 
interbank lending market.7 Additionally, the authors mentioned significant asymmetry in the 
behavior of banks in the northern part of the Eurozone versus the southern part, explaining 
that southern European banks are much more heavily reliant on refinancing operations and 
still have decreased the amount of lending done, contrary to institutions in northern Europe. 
This asymmetry also extended to the behavior of highly-rated (AAA) issuers, which saw a 
minimal impact on the yield curve, compared to financially constrained issuers. The authors 
finished by discussing that the lack of a banking and fiscal union and substantial differences 
amongst Euro members contributed to massive monetary policy instruments like the LTROs 
not being as effective (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 2012). 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
7 See Figure 2 for more information. 
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Figure 3: Key ECB Interest Rates (%) 
 
 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
In an analysis of the French banking sector, the Bank of France explained that most of the 
monetary policy transmission that one would expect from such a substantial operation 
happened after the first LTRO auction in December. The impact of the second auction was 
much more muted. Demand for the facility was highest in banks that were more liquidity 
constrained, and large, corporate borrowers tended to benefit the most from participating. 
Additionally, firms that had a previous history of strong profitability saw a positive impact 
on their supply of credit from lenders, suggesting that the policies did not lead to “zombie 
lending.” Smaller firms, which were more reliant on bank funding and consequently more 
vulnerable to a credit crunch, saw a positive effect, but not to the same degree that large and 
“intermediate” borrowers did. The top 1% of borrowers had an increased credit supply that 
was 63% larger than the average firm used in the 24-bank sample. The most important 
finding to come out of this study was that, according to the authors’ base estimate, every €1 
billion in liquidity borrowed from the facility is associated with a credit increase of only €186 
million (Andrade et al. 2017).  
The Federal Reserve’s analysis of the operations found that private credit absent the LTROs 
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and the subsequent restoration of private credit was driven by lenders that were more 
exposed to the credit crunch. On the other hand, less-exposed lenders tended to use the 
attractive, low-rate funding to purchase higher-yield sovereign bonds, often from peripheral 
countries. In the case of Italy, which had established a government guarantee program, the 
authors found that many banks, regardless of the extent of their exposure, would self-select 
into the government guarantee program and then pledge those same securities as collateral. 
While more liquidity-constrained banks used the guarantee more, larger, less-affected banks 
more regularly exhibited the “reach-for-yield” behaviors described above. Specifically, the 
Fed found that, for every Euro borrowed, exposed and less-exposed banks invested €0.44 
and €0.83 in government bonds, respectively. More-exposed banks invested €0.13 of every 
Euro in private credit (Carpinelli and Crosignani 2017). 
One finding that appears to be mostly constant throughout various analyses of the program 
is that more liquidity-constrained and stressed institutions, often located in “riskier” 
peripheral countries, used the facilities disproportionately more. Miguel García-Posada and 
Marcos Marchetti discussed the bank lending channel of the monetary policy transmission 
of LTROs extensively, saying that the operations had “a positive, moderate-sized effect” on 
the supply of bank credit to firms. They estimated that annual credit growth directly 
attributable to the LTROs ranged from 0.8% to 1%, and that SMEs benefitted more from this 
credit growth because they had fewer options to raise funding that larger firms could tap. 
Large firms, especially those with strong lending relationships with financial institutions, 
were not significantly affected at all because, as the authors explain, “relationship lending is 
a more stable source of credit than transaction lending” (García-Posada and Marchetti 2016).  
Thus, the evaluations suggested that the three-year LTROs had a mixed impact. This was due 
in large part to many institutions opting to keep substantial amounts of borrowed funds at 
the ECB, a lack of significant upward movement in major macroeconomic fundamentals, and 
other noneconomic factors, such as the structure of the Eurozone itself. Despite these 
endogenous and exogenous weaknesses, the most favorable finding was that the hit that 
funding markets had taken as a result of the stress induced by the sovereign debt crisis had 
been weathered. The precipitous falls in various macroeconomic and financial aggregates 
slowed, though their recovery would be slow despite continued ECB intervention.  
Banks that were hit the hardest by the credit crunch tended to use the facility the most, and 
their less-affected counterparts still used the facilities but did little to drive the restoration 
of private credit. Less-exposed lenders opted instead to invest cheap central bank financing 
in high-yield sovereign bonds. The overall effect on the bank lending channel and, 
specifically, private credit, was relatively small compared to the size of the program. 
However, the facilities appeared to halt or considerably dampen the freezing of the Euro-
area money market and prevented a credit crunch from leaking into the real economy. In a 
press release following the allotment of the first three-year LTRO, Mario Draghi stated that, 
“. . . we do think that this decision has at least prevented a credit contraction that would have 
been more serious, far more serious (Draghi and Constâncio 2012).”  
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